This paper studies the tendency to use negative ads. For this purpose we focus on an interesting industry (political campaigns) and an intriguing empirical regularity (the tendency to "go negative" is higher in close races). We present a model of electoral competition in which ads inform voters either on the good traits of the candidate or on the bad traits of his opponent. We find that in equilibrium the proportion of negative ads depends on both voters' knowledge and the candidate's budget. Furthermore, for an interesting subset of the parameter space, negativity increases in both knowledge and budget. Using data on the elections for the US House of Representative in 2000, 2002 and 2004, we examine the model and its implications. Using non-structural estimation we find that negativity indeed increases in both voters' knowledge and the candidate's budget. Furthermore, we also find that knowledge and budget mediate the effect of closeness on negativity. Using structural estimation we reinforce these findings. Specifically, we find that the model's parameters are within the subset of the parameters space discussed above. Thus, the evidence implies that the model is not only helpful in identifying variables that were ignored by previous studies (i.e., knowledge and budget) but also in explaining an intriguing empirical regularity.
Introduction
This study presents a model of negative advertising and examines it empirically. By "negative advertising" we refer to cases in which the ad discusses the competitor. The empirical context of the research is political advertising, where negative advertising is frequent and variation in negativity is high. The aim of this study is not only to shed light on the tendency to "go negative" but also to explain an interesting empirical regularity -the closer the political race, the higher the proportion of negative ads (Goldstein and Freedman 2002a) . We present a model of electoral competition in which ads inform voters either on the good traits of the candidate or on the bad traits of her opponent. We find that in equilibrium the proportion of negative ads depends on both voters' knowledge and candidates' budget. Furthermore, for a subset of the parameter space, negativity increases in both knowledge and budget. We find this subset of the parameter space interesting, since close races are not only characterized by high negativity, but also by (a) high media coverage (West 1994 ) which can lead to high knowledge and (b) large marketing spending (i.e., large budgets) by the candidates (Goldstein and Freedman 2002a) . In this sense, for that subset of the parameter space, our model can tie together these three empirical regularities.
We examine the model and its implications using both non-structural and structural estimation and data on the elections for the US House of Representative in 2000, 2002 and 2004 . The nonstructural estimation demonstrates that negativity indeed increases in both voters' knowledge and the candidate's budget. Interestingly, these variables were ignored by previous studies of negative advertising. Furthermore, we also find that knowledge and budget mediate the effect of closeness on negativity. The structural estimation results reinforce these findings. Specifically, we find that the model's parameters are within the subset of the parameter space discussed above.
In commercial environments firms can improve their standing (profits, stock value, etc.) either by becoming more attractive to their audience (i.e., positive appeals) or by making their competitors less appealing (i.e., negative appeals). While some combative acts, such as sabotaging competitors' products, are forbidden by law, comparative (which implicitly includes negative appeals) advertising is not only allowed, but even encouraged by the Federal Trade Commission. 1 Furthermore, the 1 See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/policystmt/ad-compare.htm for the FTC statement on comparative (negative) ad-portion of comparative advertisements out of all advertisements has been approximated as close to one out of three (Niemann 1987) , representing a substantial advertising volume. Indeed, arguably some of the most memorable recent ads and advertising campaigns were negative. For example, the "Mac versus PC" campaign of Apple, the wireless carrier campaigns of Verizon and AT&T, and the "1984" ad by supporters of Obama in the previous primary campaign. 2 Yet, research on negative advertisements is relatively thin. 3 Furthermore, almost all the scholars that studied negative (versus positive) advertising examined consumers (and voters) reactions to them, not firms' motivation to use them. Here we present a theoretical foundation for the strategic use of negative advertising (i.e., we solve for the proportion of negativity in equilibrium) and examine our theory empirically.
In order to learn the most about negative advertising we focus on an application in which negativity is frequent and exhibits high variation -political campaigns. Furthermore, we aim to explain one of the most interesting empirical regularities about negativity in political campaigns -that is, the greater tendency to go negative in competitive elections. For example, in the 2000
Senate elections the portion of all ads that were negative was 33% in the less competitive races but 65% in the more competitive races (Goldstein and Freedman 2002a) . 4 This empirical regularity is important both because it is a central feature of the application studied here (i.e., political campaigns) and because, more generally, it is an intriguing relationship between competition and advertising tone. Thus, we believe that a model that can explain this regularity is likely to be insightful about the strategic forces behind negative advertising.
To shed light on the empirical regularity and incentives to go negative, we present a model. In the model there are two candidates, a Republican and a Democrat, and each one of them has good traits (e.g., effective manager) and bad traits (e.g., performs badly under pressure). Of course, vertising.
2 For a few examples of the "Mac versus PC" search for the following codes in youtube: ci2D1ig4df4, 1EbCyibkNB0, GQb_Q8WRL_g and eU9EflLJuf8. Check out the many spoofs of these commercials in youtube. They reflect the involvement level these commercials encourage. For the "1984" commercial search for 6h3G-lMZxjo. Note also that comparative ads tend to be more memorable (Grewal et al. 1997) . 3 Notice that we are using the terms "comparative" and "negative" to refer to cases in which the ad discusses the firm's competitor. The precise meaning in the formal theory will become clear soon. 4 In presenting the findings of Goldstein and Freedman, we combine "Contrast" and "Attack" ads, as each specifically mentions the opponent and implies a negative statement.
voters' utility increases in the candidate's good traits and decreases in the bad traits, but not all of the traits are known to the public. The model has two decision stages. In the first the candidates raise funds and decide their budget. 5 In the second they decide how to divide their budget between ads that present their good traits (i.e., positive advertising) and ads that present their opponent's bad traits (i.e., negative advertising).
We find that there is a unique equilibrium in the first stage and that (in the second stage) the portion of negative ads in a campaign is a function of both the size of the budget, and the level of voters' knowledge (specifically, how much they know even without any exposure to ads). Furthermore, for a subset of the parameter space, negativity increases in both knowledge and budget.
As pointed out above, these findings are interesting since close races are not only characterized by higher negativity, but also by larger budgets and more intense media coverage (which can lead to high knowledge). In this sense, our model can tie together these three empirical regularities. examine the model and its implications using both non-structural and structural estimation. The non-structural estimation demonstrates that negativity is indeed positively related to voters' knowledge. For example, we find that candidates who became well-known by holding a public position in their past tended to be more negative. The other variables that measure knowledge on the candidates, such as their media coverage, are also supportive of the model. We also find that negativity is positively related to the candidates' budget even when we account for the endogeneity of the budget via a control function treatment. Furthermore, as hypothesized we find evidence that the relationship between the closeness of the race and negativity is mediated by knowledge and budget.
In the structural estimation we treat both the budget and its division between negative and positive ads as endogenous variables. The results reinforce the findings from the non-structural estimation -we find that the model's parameters are within the subset of the parameters space discussed above. Thus, the evidence implies that the model is not only helpful in shedding a light on the incentive to "go negative" but also in explaining the interesting empirical regularity -the closer the race, the higher the negativity. 5 The inclusion of the contribution stage in the model is done mostly for estimation purposes (i.e., so that we can account for the endogeneity of the budget in the structural estimation).
Negative advertising has been researched broadly under a variety of names including comparative, contrast, disparaging, and attack ads. The effect on consumers of positive and negative advertising has been examined in commercial settings and even more intensely in political campaigns.
Research in commercial settings finds that comparative ads garner more attention, awareness, message processing, and more favorable attitudes toward the sponsored brand than noncomparative ads (Grewal et al. 1997) . A stream of research has examined the psychological responses to negative advertising (e.g., Shiv et al. 1997 ) and psychological processes that moderate the response to comparative ads (e.g., Thompson and Hamilton 2006) .
In contrast, much of the early evidence in political campaigns (Lau et al. 1999 ) was equivocal on whether negative advertisements have different effects than positive advertising. However, more recent research has begun to garner less ambiguous results. With improved measures of advertising tone and exposure, Goldstein and Freedman (2002b) find that negative ads increase voter involvement. Phillips et al. (2008) find that the impact of negative and positive advertisements differs once prior preferences are considered. Finally, Che et al. (2007) examine the effect of negative political advertising on election outcomes, finding that the average voter responds positively to negative ads and not at all to positive ads. Thus, studies of negative advertising in both commercial and political settings have found that negative and positive advertising can influence viewer response differently.
As mentioned in the introduction, most scholars that studied negative advertising examined consumers' reactions to them rather than firms' motivation to use them. Still, this issue was not completely ignored by scholars. In the commercial setting, for instance, Chen et al. (2008) model "combative" advertising, which can shift customer preferences away from a competitor's product, and show the effect of such advertising on equilibrium prices and profits. Similarly, Yang and Gerstner (2006) explore a theoretical model of negative comparative advertisements and demonstrate that such advertisements can reduce price competition, cause customers to exit, and decrease social welfare. However, we differ from both of these papers since they neither consider the choice between positive and negative advertising nor the conditions in which one or the other is optimal. Shaffer and Zettelmeyer (2009) show how the inclusion of a retailer and in-store displays in the model discourages the manufacturer from engaging in comparative advertising. While there are various differences between their approach and ours, the most fundamental one is that we introduce knowledge as the mechanism through which ads affect individuals.
There are also two earlier theoretical studies that explored the reasons for going negative in political campaigns -Skaperdas and Grofman (1995) and Harrington and Hess (1996) . Both studies focused on the differences between the frontrunner and his competitor in their tendency to "go negative". While both predict that frontrunners will be less negative than trailing candidates, their explanations are different. Theilman and Wilhite (1998) tested both models using a pseudoexperimental study of political consultants' responses to hypothetical campaign scenarios. They focus on estimating the effect of negative and positive ads on voters' choices, but they also present a model of strategic communication and use their "demand" estimates in a candidate choice model of advertising tone. Interestingly, they find that the "demand" estimates help them to explain the "supply" of negative ads.
Unlike the studies above we both present an equilibrium-model of negative advertising and test it empirically (using both non-structural and structural estimation). Furthermore, our theory introduces factors (such as knowledge and budget) that were ignored by previous studies, but are supported by the data. Finally, our model does not only explain the incentive to "go negative," but also shed light on an interesting empirical regularity -the positive correlation between negativity and the closeness of the race. Before presenting the model it is worth noting its role in this study. While the main contribution of this study is demonstrating empirically that two variables that were previously ignored (budget and knowledge) play an important role in the tendency to go negative and that they can explain the relationship between the closeness of the race and negativity, the model also has a critical role.
First, it identifies these variables. Second, it offers a way to tie together three interesting empirical regularities about close races. Third, it puts some (theoretically based) structure on the estimation.
The next section presents the model. The data, preliminary results and the non-structural estimation are described in section 3. The fourth section discuss some estimation issues and the results of the structural estimation and the last section concludes.
Model
This section presents a model of candidate decisions about the negativity of their advertising. While the central element of the model is negativity, its scope is widened to include both individuals' voting choices and the candidates' choices of the advertising budget. Voters' choices reflect the incentive of the candidate and the budget represents the candidates' constraint. The sequence of events is the following: (i) candidates decide on their spending/budget, (ii) they choose the proportion of their budget that is devoted to negative ads (versus positive ads) and finally (iii) the individuals make their voting choices. We solve the model, of course, in the opposite order.
The basic ingredients of the model are the following. There are two candidates: one represents the Democratic party and is denoted by d and the other represents the Republican party and is denoted by r. Each candidate has good traits denoted by a (e.g., effective manager) and bad traits denoted by b (e.g., performs badly under pressure).
Throughout the exposition, we will refer to the voter as a male, to the focal candidate as a female and to her rival as a male.
The voter
We consider a representative consumer framework. However, it is easy to show that the results hold for a more general setting in which there are two loyal segments and one segment of independents (a-la Narasimhan 1988).
A central ingredient of our theory is voters' knowledge. Thus, we start this subsection by discussing our formulation of knowledge and only then describe individuals' voting choices.
Knowledge
Not all of the candidates' traits are known to the public. Accordingly, the voter's knowledge can be thought of as the stock of candidate traits to which he has been exposed. The total stock is the sum of two components: prior knowledge and knowledge attained through candidates' political advertisements, i.e, advertisements are informative. Formally, let a j represent the voter's knowledge level of candidate j's good traits at the time of the voting decision and decompose it into two parts (i) knowledge of her good traits prior to seeing ads (denoted by a j0 ), and (ii) knowledge learned from her advertisements (denoted by a j1 ). Thus, a j = a j0 + a j1 . Define b j , b j0 , and b j1 similarly with respect to the bad traits. Below we specify (a) the impact of knowledge on utility, and (b) the production function of a j1 and b j1 (i.e., how candidates' ads are transformed to voter knowledge).
The dual channel assumption
Following previous studies (including experimental, survey and brain research) we assume that the voter does not combine the information on the good and bad traits into one construct. Instead he keeps a separate record for each type of trait and his utility is additive and separable in both. We refer to this assumption as "dual channel". 
Voting choices
Based on this dual channel assumption, the voter's utility from candidate j is
where ε is the individual's evaluation of the candidate that is uncorrelated with knowledge and not observed by the candidates (i.e., a random variable). Notice that the representative consumer assumption can be replaced by assuming that ε are i.i.d. across individuals.
We further assume that g(a j ) = a α j and f (b j ) = b β j . The solution of the model will obviously depend on whether α and/or β are greater or less than 1 and which one of them is higher. We discuss these issues as well as the reasonability of each assumption later. Furthermore, this formulation assumes that the effect of a trait on the utility is either concave or convex. An alternative specification is an s-shape function. Given that we estimate this model using congressional data and voters' knowledge about their congresspersons is usually quite low, it is unlikely that our data would cover both the convex and concave parts of an s-shape function. Therefore and in order to maintain a parsimonious model, we employ a power function instead.
Under the assumption that ε j s comes from an "extreme value" distribution with function exp(− exp(−ε)), the probability that the individual votes for candidate j (denoted by p j ) is
where −j indexes the rival of j.
We are now ready to discuss candidates strategies.
Candidates' negativity
Given voter responses, each candidate decides how to divide her/his total budget, denoted by E j , between negative and positive ads. Let e j represent candidate j's spending on positive advertising (i.e., about her good traits). It is easy to show that under the model's assumptions (presented below) candidates will always exhaust their budget. Thus, her spending on negative advertising (i.e., about the bad traits of her opponent) is E j − e j .
Knowledge production function
We assume a standard convex cost function of producing knowledge -i.e., a j1 = e It is important to distinguish between the following three parameters -α, β, and γ. While γ represents the learning aspect of the informative advertising that results in decreasing marginal returns, α and β do not pertain to the learning process. Instead, they are preference parameters that capture the impact of knowledge about traits (good and bad) on utility.
Optimal negativity
The candidates choose the level of expenditures on positive and negative advertising to maximize the total votes that they expect to receive. Note that in a representative consumer model, the voting probability, p j , captures the total votes. Candidates are interested in total votes in order to maximize both the probability of success and the mandate for their desired policies (this is supported empirically in Shachar 2009).
Thus, subject to the budget constraint candidate j simply maximizes p j (e j ) where
Recall that the candidate can affect her winning probability either by increasing knowledge about her own good traits (where a j = a j0 + a j1 = a j0 + e 
The first order condition for candidate j, denoted by λ j , is then
where e * j denotes the optimal value of e j . It is easy to see that the optimal negativity depends on the voter's prior knowledge and the candidate's budget -e * j (a j0 , b −j0 , E j ). Of course, the effect of these variables on negativity depends on the model's parameters -α, β and γ. We explore the effect of knowledge and budget in the following subsection, and use them to guide our empirical analysis.
It is important to point out that (due to the dual channel of knowledge) e * j does not depend on e * −j . In other words, the negativity of one candidate is independent from the negativity of her rival. However, we soon solve for the equilibrium values of E j and E −j and demonstrate that the candidate's budget depends on her rival's budget. This means that given the budget the negativity decisions of the candidates (in the second stage of the game) are independent. However, they are not independent when the model includes the endogenous budget.
The effect of knowledge and budget on negativity
We start by studying the effect of the voter's prior knowledge about j's good traits or her rival's bad traits (i.e., a j0 and b −j0 ) on j's optimal level of negativity. Note that the formal foundation of the discussion in this subsection appears in Web Appendix Section 1.
The effect of these prior knowledge elements depends on α and β. Specifically, an increase in a j0 leads to a decrease in e * j if α < 1 and to an increase if α > 1. The logic behind this result is simple. If α < 1 the marginal utility of good traits is diminishing. Thus, when a j0 increases the marginal utility of a good trait (which determines the effectiveness of a positive ad) decreases and the tendency to send positive ads diminishes as well. Of course, the opposite holds for increasing marginal utility in the good traits (i.e., α > 1).
The effect of prior knowledge about the rival's bad trait on negativity depends on β in the same fashion. Specifically, an increase in b −j0 leads to a decrease in negative ads (i.e., an increase in e * j )
if β < 1 and leads to an increase in negative ads (a decrease in e * j ) if β > 1.
These implications suggest that data on voters' knowledge of the candidates coupled with information on campaign's negativity can identify the parameters α and β. For example, if candidates whose good traits are well-known have a higher propensity to go negative than candidates with less well-known good traits, it would suggest that α is likely to be smaller than 1. It is worth nothing that prior studies of the effect of political advertising have ignored this issue and cannot assist us in determining the relationship among, α, β and 1. Interestingly, though, as we will soon see the empirical regularity that serves as one of the motivations for this study (i.e., that negativity is higher in close elections) can guide us in forming some expectations about these parameters.
Before formally examining the effect of the budget on negativity, it makes sense to intuitively identify the main driving forces. Recall that the candidate is using her advertising budget to inform the voter about her good traits and her opponent's bad traits. Thus, larger budgets ultimately mean that the voter is more knowledgeable, and as we have just seen, under certain conditions, knowledge has a direct effect on negativity. Accordingly, the effect of the budget on negativity is unambiguous for a subset of the parameter space (α < 1 < β or β < 1 < α) and ambiguous for the rest.
To understand the logic behind this result consider the case α < 1 < β. It can be shown that for these parameters the proportion of the budget allocated to negativity is an increasing function of the budget (i.e.,
Since the marginal utility is diminishing in good traits (i.e., α < 1), more knowledge about her good traits would lead the candidate to become more negative in her campaign. Accordingly, since the marginal utility is increasing in bad traits (i.e., 1 < β), as the voter becomes more knowledgeable about her rival's bad traits, she will also tend to go more negative. Thus, for α < 1 < β knowledge, and hence, budget, has an unambiguous effect on the campaign's negativity -the higher the budget, the more negative the campaign.
When β < 1 < α exactly the opposite holds and as the budget increases the negativity of the campaign decreases. When both α and β are either below or above 1, the effect of budget on negativity is ambiguous. Furthermore, in such cases the effect does not depend only on these two parameters, but also on the prior knowledge variables.
As discussed in the introduction, we estimate this model directly and thus we will have structural estimates of the parameters α and β. However, it turns out that we can form expectations about these parameters even prior to the structural estimation. Recall that close races are characterized by (i) higher negativity, (ii) higher budgets, and (iii) higher media coverage. An appealing aspect of the suggested model is that it can tie together all these characteristics of close races for a specific subset of α and β -specifically, α < 1 < β. As discussed above, under this condition both knowledge and budget has an unambiguous positive effect on negativity. Since intense media coverage is likely to lead to more knowledgeable voters, close races are characterized by higher knowledge and higher budget and these two lead to higher negativity. This means that for α < 1 < β it might be possible to fully explain the relationship between closeness and negativity via knowledge and budget. In other words, it is possible that when budget and knowledge are included in the empirical analysis, closeness will not have a direct effect on negativity.
Finally, note that even when α > 1 or β > 1, the second order conditions can hold (i.e., concavity) as long as some mild conditions are satisfied. For example, for α < 1 < β, a sufficient condition is βγ < 1. We verify such conditions hold in the structural estimation. Furthermore, note that it is easy to show that under such conditions the marginal effect of both positive and negative ads on the utility is diminishing. In other words, in the solution of this model, advertising always has a wear-out effect.
Budget
As discussed above, in the first stage of the model the candidates decide on their budget. This stage is included in the model mostly for empirical reasons. Specifically, we wish to account for the endogeneity of the budget in the estimation and this subsection provides a theoretical framework that is consistent with the other two parts of the model -the negativity decision of the candidates and the voting decisions of the individual.
Candidates' spending has, of course, received a lot of attention from previous scholars. They have identified two major incentives to contribute to political candidates: investment (Baron 1989) and partisan (Snyder 1989). The "investors" donate to the candidate who is more likely to win.
They hope to get their money's worth after the election via regulatory favors. The "partisans" donate to the candidate whose ideological positions they prefer. Wand (2006) demonstrates that since 1994 the role of the "partisans" increased and they are now the dominating contributing-force. 7 Still, we would include in our analysis variables that would allow the two types of contributions.
In the second stage of the model (after the budget has been determined) the candidate maximizes her voting probability, p j , that depends on the negativity of both candidates and their budget -
. However, in the first stage of the model she needs to account also for the cost of collecting the donations that form the budget. The cost function is denoted by C j (E j ) and we assume that ∂C j ∂E j > 0 and that
The cost function is indexed by j because in the empirical work we will allow it to depend on candidate specific characteristics such as her ability to collect contributions.
Thus, the objective function of candidate j is p j (E j ) − C j (E j ) and her first order condition (recall:
∂p j ∂e j is equal to zero at e * j ) is:
The second order condition is presented and discussed in the web appendix.
The first order condition has three factors: (1) the closeness of the race (
the marginal effect of budget on the voting probability (δ j (E j )), and (3) the marginal cost of the budget (
). While the last two factors depend only on the budget of candidate j, the first one also depends on the budget of her competitor. As a result, the optimal budget of candidate j (denoted by E * j ) depends on the budget of her competitor. Furthermore, the relationship is not monotonic. Specifically, when j is more likely to win an increase in her competitor's budget shrinks the winning margin and leads to a closer race. The closeness of the race encourages her to collect more donations (even at a higher cost). On the other hand, when −j is the more likely winner, an increase in the budget of her competitor further decreases the closeness of the race and the focal candidate will be less likely to seek contributions.
Although the reaction functions are not monotonic, it turns out that there exists a unique pure strategy equilibrium to this game as stated in the following proposition (where E * j (E −j ) represents the optimal reaction function of j to the budget of her opponent).
Proposition 1 There exists a pair
Furthermore, for any E
Proof. See appendix.
The uniqueness of the equilibrium will be useful in the estimation of this model.
Candidates spending in equilibrium depend on the closeness of the race, the knowledge of the voters and any variables that affect the cost of collecting contributions. The effect of closeness is clear and intuitive -the closer the race the higher the budgets. This result is consistent with previous theoretical and empirical studies. The effect of knowledge is ambiguous and (as discussed in the previous subsection) depends on the parameters α and β. The effect of the variables that affect the cost function is quite straightforward -any variable that decreases the marginal cost (e.g., ability to collect contributions) increases the budget.
Before moving to the data and the estimation, it is important to highlight the role of the model in this study. First, the model identifies two types of variables that were ignored by previous studies of campaign negativity -candidates' spending and voters knowledge. Second, as discussed above, the model offers an elegant and intuitive way to tie together three interesting empirical regularities about close races (i.e., in close races the budgets, the media attention and negativity are all high).
Specifically, a sufficient condition to tie these regularities is α < 1 < β. Finally, the model enables us to put some (theoretically based) structure on the estimation. For example, our model takes into account that voters' knowledge, that can be partially unobserved, affects both the budget of the candidates and the negativity of the campaign. Thus, the structure can enable us to ensure the consistency and efficiency of our estimates.
4 Data, preliminary and non-structural results
Data
The data set focuses on three U. This results in 418 districts with two candidates and 12 districts with one candidate. For some of the preliminary, non-structural analyses, we limit ourselves to candidates that spent positive sums on advertising and for the structural analysis we use only districts with two candidates.
The data are drawn from a number of sources. We begin by describing the measures of the two endogenous variables, E and e * (i.e., budget and negativity). The primary source of data for advertising quantity and cost is The Campaign Media Advertising Group (CMAG hereafer).
CMAG employs a technology that records and creates storyboards for every ad that is shown on network TV and some cable channels for the DMAs it monitors. The Wisconsin Advertising Project then systematically codes these ads for tone. From this data we construct our measures of budget and negativity. For the budget measure, we sum the estimated costs of each ad aired by a candidate or party in the congressional district. We also use cost as the basis for constructing our negativity measure. The cost of an ad is closely related to the size of the audience that is expected to see the ad. Hence, our measure of negativity is the portion of total ad budget allocated to negative ads. The Wisconsin Advertising project codes ads into three broad categories: attack, promote, and contrast. We use as negative ads those coded as attack ads and those coded as contrast ads that are subdivided as mostly attack ads.
We now turn to our measures of closeness. We use a measure regularly discussed in the media Finally, we use variables that can measure the cost of fundraising, i.e., variables that might affect C j . First, we consider variables that capture the investor and partisanship perspectives on
fundraising. An investor perspective suggests that funds are given as an investment into influencing future regulatory votes. In this sense, the likely winner of the race has lower costs to fundraising than the likely loser. We include F rontrunner to capture this perspective. A partisan perspective suggests partisans give to their own party, so that the candidate with more partisans will have lower costs. We include our measure, P artisanship, to capture this perspective.
Second, we include other cost-shifters that are specific to the district or candidate. For districtspecific variables, we include indicators for whether the current presidential races were close in the state (from the Cook's Political Report) and whether there was a senate or governor race in the state.
These concurrent variables capture potential cost increases due to higher demand (i.e., crowding the airwaves with political ads). We also include demographic variables as described above. For candidate-specific variables, we include an indicator for whether the candidate was wealthy. This can capture any idiosyncratic ability to pay out of pocket. For the wealth measure, we start from a candidate biographic database provided by VoteSmart and augment it with additional information gleaned from publicly available sources. After completing the information, two independent judges were used to code whether each candidate was wealthy. The inter-coder reliability was 82% and all discrepancies were resolved by a third coder. Finally, we include a measure for the innate ability of the candidate to raise funds. We use the total contributions the candidate received in the previous campaign (P ast_Contributions). This was collected from the Federal Elections Commission mandatory filings on campaign contributions.
We leave discussion of the knowledge variables to the next section.
Preliminary results
Before employing our structural model to study the data, we first examine the data to understand some basic relationships. In this subsection we take a preliminary look at the relationship between knowledge and negativity. Republicans voted against him.
We consider "voting against your party on the Iraq resolution" as a good trait of a candidate, because a candidate is likely to behave in such a way if the party affiliation of her district differs from her party. Indeed, in our data the tendency to vote against a party is higher the lower the support for this party in the district, and thus "voting against your party on the Iraq resolution"
should be considered as a good trait of a candidate. 8 The data support our hypothesis. The negativity (i.e., the share of ads that are negative in Consistent with the previous analysis, voting against the party leads to 18% more negativity than voting with the party and is (marginally) significant (p<0.05 on one-tailed test). These results, which are somewhat counter intuitive -you did a good thing (voted with your district and against your party) and as a result you go more negative -is consistent with our hypothesis that α < 1.
Of course, it is possible that the results from this simple test are due to a third factor that is not accounted for here. We will soon use richer (structural and non-structural) tests of our theory in which we account for a range of control variables. For now we consider this finding as a preliminary and encouraging.
Non-structural estimation
In this subsection we use non-structural estimation to examine the main implication of the model that negativity depends on the budget and knowledge. Furthermore, we also aim to test the secondary implication of the model that the effect of closeness on negativity is mediated by knowledge and budget (i.e., it does not hold when these variables are included in the analysis). We have already described many of the variables needed for this estimation (e.g. negativity, budget and closeness). Now we need to describe our measures of voters' knowledge. Note that one of these measures was already described -the vote on the Iraq resolution. The summary statistics of all the variables are reported in Table 1 .
Knowledge
As discussed above, voters are not very knowledgeable about their congressional candidates. Under which conditions will voters' knowledge about a candidate go beyond the minimum? First, if the news media pay attention to her. Second, if she has previously held a public position and thus the voters were exposed to her in the past. To capture these sources of knowledge we have collected data on media coverage, prior exposure, and incumbency status.
Our media coverage variable is denoted as Media_Coverage_Self for the candidate and
Media_Coverage_Opponent for her opponent. This variable is an estimate of the number of news articles that covered a candidate. In other words, we have counted the number of articles in local newspapers that have mentioned the name of the candidate in the two months prior to Labor Day (collected from newslibrary.com). Furthermore, to ensure that the count was accurate we have used multiple variations of each candidate's name. We use a log transform to capture diminishing returns on media and to account for skewness of the measure.
The second variable is binary and is denoted as P rior_Exposure_Self for the candidate and P rior_Exposure_Opponent for her opponent. It is equal to one if the candidate had previously run a campaign for a U.S. congressional seat or if she previously held a publicly elected office with reasonable district-wide exposure (e.g., a school board in a small town would not count).
This measure was constructed in three steps. First, as the starting point, biographical information on candidates was obtained from VoteSmart. Second, a large data enhancement effort collected additional information to fill in missing and imprecise data. Third, two coders independently reviewed every candidate to determine whether they fit the prior exposure definition. The intercoder reliability for this measure was 93%. A third coder resolved any discrepancies.
The third variable is also binary and is denoted as Incumbent_Self for the candidate and
Incumbent_Opponent for her opponent. It is equal to one if the candidate was a representative in the prior U.S. congress (i.e., an incumbent). The incumbent campaigned in a previous election and acted as the district's representative for at least two years. Thus, in general, voters know him better than his challenger. That said, prior research (see Lau and Rovner 2009 for a review) suggests there may be important effects of Incumbent_Self on negativity other than a knowledge effect. In the non-structural estimation, we are unable to separate these effects, but in the structural model, we are.
Unlike the vote on Iraq, the other knowledge variables are not specific on whether the knowledge is about the candidate's good or bad traits. Although they are not specific, these variables can still be used to examine the model's implications. Specifically, unless α = β = 1 we expect that the knowledge variables to have a significant effect on negativity. As discussed above, if α < 1 (α > 1) an increase in a j0 should lead to an increase (decrease) in negativity, and if β > 1 (β < 1)
an increase in b −j0 is expected to lead to an increase (decrease) in negativity. Notice also that for the subset of the parameter space discussed above α < 1 < β any increase in knowledge (on either a j0 or b −j0 ) is expected to lead to higher negativity.
When voters are more knowledgeable about a candidate (say, due to high media coverage) they are more familiar with both her bad and good traits. Thus, higher knowledge about the candidate implies higher a j0 and therefore, from the model, higher negativity if α < 1 (and lower negativity if α > 1). Accordingly, higher knowledge about the opponent implies higher b −j0 and thus, from the model, higher negativity if β > 1 (lower negativity if β < 1). Of course, it would have been better if all of our variables were specific on whether the knowledge is about the good or bad traits, and thus we return to this issue when we report results and suggest being cautious in interpreting them.
Estimation results
Instead of presenting only the results that directly examine the main hypotheses, Table 2 presents the parameters of interest from the estimation of four models. Such an approach enables an assessment of the relative importance of various parts of the model. In the estimation we account for the censoring of the dependent variable at 0 and 1 (i.e., the proportion of negativity cannot be smaller than 0 and bigger than 1) and include various "control variables": (1) The first model includes (in addition to the control variables) only the closeness variables.
The results provide very strong support to the empirical regularity that we wish to explain -the closer the race the more negative it is. Recall that the Cook report ranks districts on four levels of closeness according to the following order: non-close races, likely, leaning and tossups. We find that negativity is 36 percentage points higher in "likely" than in non-close districts. It is 17
percentage points higher in "leaning" than in "likely" and 15 percentage points higher in tossups than in "leaning". Furthermore, all of these differences are statistically significant at least at the two percent level.
The second model includes (in addition to the control variables) only the knowledge variables.
The results are very encouraging. We find that the higher the knowledge, the higher the negativity -as expected when α < 1 < β. All the variables, but one, have positive signs and are different from zero at a good statistical level. Specifically, the two media coverage variables are different from zero at the 1 percent level. We find that as the candidate gets more media attention, the candidate tends to focus more on the opponent. Recall that this variable is based on media coverage prior to labor day and negativity is based on advertising after labor day. We also find that the tendency to focus on the opponent grows as the opponent gets more media attention. In other words, the more knowledgeable is the voter (i.e., the more he knows about the candidate and/or the rival), the tendency to 'go negative' increases.
A similar picture is found when looking at the prior exposure variables. The coefficient of the P rior_Exposure_Self is different from zero at the 2.5 percent level and the one of P rior_Exposure_Opponent is different at the 7.5 percent level. This means that public exposure to either one of the candidates in the past via prior campaigns, elections, or time in public office leads to higher negativity. The prior exposure variable serves as another proxy for the knowledge level of voters (i.e., if voters were exposed to a candidate in the past, they are more likely to know her better). The coefficients of the prior exposure are consistent with those of the media coverage in the sense that both pairs suggest that knowledge on either the candidate or her rival increases the negativity of the campaign.
The final knowledge variable that supports the model's implication is the vote on the Iraq resolution. It is quite encouraging to find that its effect on negativity remains statistically significant even when the estimation accounts for various additional variables. Furthermore, its effect is different from zero even at the 0.1 percent level.
The last knowledge variable included in the analysis, Incumbent_Opponent, is not statistically different from zero in model 2.
After examining the separate impact of two sets of variables (closeness and knowledge) on negativity, we move to an examination of their joint effect. The third column presents the results when all elements of our theory-closeness, knowledge, and budget-are included. Furthermore, we account for the endogeneity of the budget via a control function treatment (details of the first stage regression are in Appendix Section 2), and for the skewness in the budget variable by using a log transform.
The most important finding of this model is that the inclusion of budget and knowledge dramatically changes the impact of the closeness variables. Specifically, as suggested by our theory, when budget and knowledge are included, closeness no longer has a significant effect on negativity. All three closeness variables turn from significant to insignificant. Furthermore, removing the closeness variables (as done in the fourth column) hardly changes the fit of the model (McFadden's R-square decreases from 58.6 to 58.5 and an insignificant change in log-likelihood). This result suggests that the finding of previous studies about the relationship between closeness and negativity is due to the exclusion of the knowledge and budget variable. Put it differently, this result implies that closeness affects negativity through (higher) budget and knowledge.
It is important to note, though, that the effect of knowledge when closeness and budget are included is not as strong. While one knowledge variable, Incumbent_Opponent, becomes positive and significant at the 7.4% level, three of the knowledge variables turn from being significant to insignificant. Further when closeness is included the effect of budget is significant at only the 5.5 percent level. Interestingly, two of the variables that lose their significance (M edia_Coverage_Self and P rior_Exposure_Self) turn out to have a significant effect in the first stage estimation of the budget. 9 Given that the closeness variables do not have a significant effect it makes sense to focus our attention on the results of the fourth column that exclude them from the analysis. There are two additional reasons to exclude these variables: (1) theoretically-our model suggests that the effect of closeness is indirect and thus there is no reason to include a direct effect in the analysis. Put 9 The other variables that assist in predicting the budget are (1) two demographic variables that represent the income of the district (the higher the income, the higher the budget), (2) the closeness variables (the closer the race, the higher the budget), and (3) total contributions for the candidate in the previous campaign. These results seem very intuitive and give some face validity to the estimation. A discussion of the estimates of the first stage regression are included in Appendix Section 2.
it differently, we do not have a theoretical justification to include the closeness variables in the negativity model, and (2) empirically-in the estimation of the third column we have had only one significant "exclusion variable" in the first stage regression (past contributions). By removing the closeness variables from the second stage, they also become "exclusion variables" and can improve the efficiency of our estimates.
The estimates in the fourth column are the closest test of our theory. It excludes closeness and includes the two sets of variables suggested by our model (knowledge and budget). The results are very supportive. Consistent with the earlier findings, more knowledge leads to higher negativity by the candidate. The effect of the budget is impressive. We find that the higher the budget the more negative is the campaign and the effect is different from zero even at the 0.1 percent level.
While we view the results of Table 2 as somewhat preliminary and focus our attention on the estimates of the structural model, these results start to draw an interesting picture.
• Budget and knowledge variables significantly relate to negativity and the impact of the closeness variables vanishes when budget and knowledge are included. Furthermore, one of the knowledge variables is based on the media coverage. These findings reinforce the idea that the high negativity of close races is due to the intense media coverage (which leads to higher knowledge) and large budgets. Note, also that close races are indeed significantly positively related with both media coverage and budget. The closest races have on average 3.6 articles per candidate while the non-competitive races have only 3.2. Similarly, the closest races have on average $1.3 million in budget per candidate while the non-competitive races have only $200,000. Moreover, once including budget and the knowledge variables, closeness is no longer significant, suggesting the effect of closeness on negativity is mediated (i.e., the relationship is spurious) by our theoretical variables. These results provide empirical support for the importance of our theoretical variables.
• Using our model, the effects of the budget and knowledge variables can be interpreted as suggesting that the parameters satisfy the following condition: α < 1 < β. First, the evidence on the budget is consistent with this condition. As discussed in the model section, an increase in the budget can lead to an increase in negativity even outside of this subset of the parameter space, but only when α < 1 < β is the effect of budget on negativity unambiguous. Second, the evidence that higher knowledge about the candidate increases negativity suggests that α < 1, and the evidence that higher knowledge about the opponent increases negativity implies that 1 < β. That said, we have to stress that this is purely an interpretation. Furthermore, given that most of our knowledge variables are not specific on whether the knowledge is about the candidate's good or bad traits, such interpretation should be taken with some caution.
• Another encouraging result from the non-structural estimation is that the three knowledge variables that turn out to be significant come from different domains. First, two are about the opponent and one is about the candidate. Second, one is related to media, another to incumbency and the last to a well-known vote. The diversity of measures gives greater support to the underlying concept of knowledge as being important to negativity decisions.
Structural estimation
Using structural estimation has three main advantages in our case. First, obtaining measures of knowledge for congressional races is a significant empirical challenge. While we are pleased with our knowledge variables, it is clear that some aspects of knowledge are left unobserved. In the estimation below we structurally account for the unobserved knowledge. Second, the choice of budget in the first stage of the game depends on the resulting negativity in the second stage, and both decisions depend on the knowledge. While we have accounted for the endogeneity of the budget in the non-structural estimation via a control function approach, the structural estimation will enable us to impose this rich relationship among budget, negativity and knowledge on the estimation. Third, the structural estimation provides us, of course, with the parameters of the theoretical model and can thus directly address the question about the values of α and β.
This section proceeds as follows. The first subsection describes some functional forms and distribution assumptions used in the structural estimation, while the second subsection presents the results.
Estimation issues
We use Bayesian estimation to estimate the model parameters. In order to define the likelihood for the estimation we need to select functional forms for the cost and prior knowledge functions and to make some distributional assumption.
We assume that the marginal cost function faced by candidate j in market m is:
where (i) the row-vector x c j,m includes variables such as the demographic factors (e.g. income and education in the district) and contributions from the most recent campaign and the parameter vector c x represents their effect on the marginal cost, (ii) the parameter ρ is the term that generates convex costs for collecting contributions, and (iii) ω is a random variable observed by the candidates but not by the econometrician that comes from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance
The prior knowledge also differs across candidates and markets for observed and unobserved reasons. Specifically, the prior knowledge about the good traits of candidate j in market m is:
where the row-vector x a j,m includes variables such as the media coverage of candidate j in market m and the parameter vector a x represents their effect on the prior knowledge, and (ii) ν a j,m is a random variable observed by the candidates but not by the econometrician that comes from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 a . This formulation has two nice features. First, it maps in a flexible way all the possible measures of knowledge considered in the non-structural estimation into the one structural knowledge variable. Second, since the knowledge variables are partially unobserved, the model practically includes unobserved heterogeneity that affects both the size of the budget and the negativity of the campaign. Thus, the structural estimation does not only endogenize the budget but also account for its correlation with the negativity for some unobserved sources. The prior knowledge about the bad traits of candidate j in market m is formulated in a similar way. Specifically:
and the variance of ν b j,m is σ 2 b .
Next, we need to account for the possibility of measurement errors (ME hereafter) in both the budget and negativity. It is reasonable to assume that there are ME in the CMAG advertising data for two reasons. First, although this data is based on almost all television markets in the United
States, CMAG does not cover all of them. Second, ME can be introduced in the coding of the advertisements.
We account for the possibility of ME in a fully structural way -that is, formulating the ME function and incorporating it into the likelihood.
The formulation is standard. Formally, the observed budget of candidate j in market m, denoted by E 0 j,m , is:
and E 0 j,m = 0 otherwise where (i) E * j,m is the unobserved level of the budget in the equilibrium, (ii) ε E j,m is a random variable that comes from a normal distribution with mean zero and variance σ 2 E , and (iii) τ is a threshold.
Specifically, we assume that if the actual budget is below some threshold it is too small to be observed by CMAG. Furthermore, for parsimony we set this threshold to be equal to the lowest budget that we observed in the data.
Accordingly, we let the observed proportion of negativity of candidate j in market m, denoted by N egativity j,m , to be:
+ ε e j,m > 0 0 Otherwise (11) where e * j,m is the unobserved optimal level of negativity from the theoretical model and ε e j,m is a random variable that comes from a normal distribution with mean x e j,m e x and variance σ 2 e . Specifically, the row-vector x e j,m includes the following variables incumbency, frontrunner, party, year, partisanship, and district demographics, the same variables used in the non-structural estimation.
In Web Appendix 3, we describe the construction of the likelihood, prior, and the sampler for the estimation. Our estimation enforces the first and second order conditions for both stages (budget and negativity) through the prior. In constructing the posterior, we use the result that there is an unique equilibrium given the second order conditions. We use a Gibbs sampler with
Metropolis-Hastings steps for some parameters. In addition to estimating the full endogenous budget model, we estimate (for comparison) a model with an exogenous budget. In the latter case we have only the negativity in the likelihood and we assume no ME unless the budget is zero. We set the parameter γ to approximately 0.725 because with this value the estimation was relatively more stable. Though γ is mathematically identified, our data does not contain enough information to estimate it.
The identification of the model's parameters was checked analytically and verified via Monte Carlo.
Estimation results
We present two sets of results-one for the model with exogenous budget and one for the model with endogenous budget. The conclusions from these results are largely the same, so we will focus on the latter results.
We start with the parameters of the knowledge functions (a x and b x ) presented in Table 3 . It turns out that while these estimates provide similar results to the ones from the non-structural estimation, the structural estimates are even more supportive when it comes to a x . Specifically, we find that all the knowledge variables have the expected sign and a significant effect on a. The estimates of b x draw a similar picture to the one from the non-structural estimation. Specifically, in the exogenous budget model the estimates have the same signs and similar significance (Media_Coverage_Opponent is only marginally significant). In the endogenous budget model, we find Incumbent_Opponent is still significant and positive, but Media_Coverage_Opponent is not significant.
While a x and b x represent the effect of the observable variables on knowledge, σ a and σ b capture the role of unobservables. It turns out that while a significant fraction of the knowledge on the bad traits is left unobserved, the observables capture most of the knowledge on the good traits.
These conclusions are based on a decomposition of the variance of the total knowledge variables into the unobserved component and the part that is due to the observed variables. The 95% Second, the unobservable part of knowledge (which can be captured via structural estimation) play an important role.
We are now ready to discuss one of the most interesting findings of the structural estimation -α and β. The results are quite clear -the posterior means are 0.23 for α and 1.32 for β. This means that the marginal utility from a good trait diminishes rapidly, while the marginal dis-utility from a bad trait increases. Furthermore, the posterior mean for βγ is 0.96 indicating both that the second order conditions are satisfied and that negative ads have a wear-out effect. In other words, while the effect of knowledge on the utility is convex, the effect of advertising is concave.
Note, that in general the credible intervals are much tighter in the endogenous than the exogenous budget model and the same phenomena exists with respect to α and β.Furthermore, we can easily reject the hypothesis that β ≤ 1 and the hypothesis that α ≥ 1. In other words, the structural estimates place us in subset of the parameter space for which the theoretical model ties together the empirical regularities introduced in the introduction. That is, close races increase negativity through their effect on media coverage and budgets. Specifically, such races attract more media coverage (that educate the voters about the candidates) and higher budgets. The resulting high levels of knowledge and budget lead (according to this model) to higher negativity.
Finally, Table 3 also presents the estimates of e x -the parameters that determine the mean of the negativity measurement error. None of them, other than the "intercept", are statistically different from zero. Note that some of these "control variables" (e.g., F rontrunner) have had significant effects in the non-structural estimation and in the estimation where the budget was treated as exogenous. 
Conclusion
In order to gain a better understanding of the tendency of firms to "go negative" we have focused on an interesting industry (political campaigns) and empirical regularity (the tendency to "go negative" is higher the closer the race). We have offered a model of electoral competition that identifies two variables that were completely ignored by previous studies of campaign negativitycandidates' spending and voters knowledge. Furthermore, this model offers an elegant and intuitive way to tie together three interesting empirical regularities about close races (i.e., in close races, the budgets, the media attention and negativity are all high). Using data on U. S. congressional races in 2000, 2002 and 2004 and both non-structural and structural estimation, we find that the data support the model and its implications. Specifically, we find that (i) negativity is increasing in both knowledge and budget and (ii) that the relationship between the closeness of the race and negativity is mediated by knowledge and budget.
The structural estimates suggest that while the marginal utility of good traits is diminishing, the marginal dis-utility of bad traits in increasing. While these results might have an intuitive appeal, they should be treated with some caution for at least three reasons. First, our estimates are not based on directly observing voters choices as a function of candidates' good and bad traits but rather on candidates' strategies (i.e., tendency to "go negative"). As such, the estimates of α and β, should be viewed mainly as an interpretation of the data. Second, while our data include a variety of knowledge measures only one of them (the vote on Iraq) is specific to the candidates' good or bad traits. Third, our estimates are based on congressional races only. As mentioned above, voters' knowledge about their congresspersons is usually quite low. Thus, if the utility has an s-shape response structure with respect to the candidates' traits, it is possible that the marginal utility will be increasing in the congressional races but decreasing in (say) presidential races in which the knowledge level is much higher.
The results of this study are specific for political campaigns not only because the data is based on congressional races, but also since the model was structured to capture such a setting (e.g. a fundraising competition in the first stage of the game). As such, it is difficult to generalize the findings to commercial settings. However, our findings might highlight interesting avenues to examine negative commercial advertising. For example, it seems reasonable to assume that consumers' knowledge is higher in mature product categories. If knowledge plays a similar role in commercial competition, we should expect to find more negative advertising in such markets. It is also interesting to examine whether the relationship between budget and negativity has similar features in the commercial setting by comparing markets with intense advertising with those with much fewer ads. A final possible parallel between the political case and the commercial setting relates to the empirical regularity that we have focused on (about the relationship between closeness and negativity). It seems that a somewhat similar relationship exists in commercial markets.
Specifically, it was recently suggested that "as the economy gets ugly, marketers get nasty" (Vranica 2008 ). Another way to frame this observation is that when the going gets tough (i.e., close races or slowing economy), the tough get going (i.e., ads tend to be more negative). Furthermore, when the economy is not growing the only way that a firm can grow is at the expense of its competitors.
This means greater competition over the same consumers, and the parallel to political races is fairly immediate.
It is interesting to note that there can be an alternative explanation, based on emotional reac-tions, for why is it that "when the going gets tough, the tough get going". Specifically, it is possible that the tendency to "go negative" is higher when the decision maker is under stress. Since close elections (as well as slowing economy) can raise the level of stress, it can also lead to a higher tendency to "go negative". We find this alternative mechanism as an interesting avenue for future research.
Another interesting aspect for future research is the dynamic aspects of negativity. Our model is static when it comes to negativity. However, in practice the dynamics are quite interesting. For example, it turns out that as the election draws nearer candidates tend to become more negative (Goldstein and Freedman 2002a) . Interestingly, this observation seems consistent with the knowledge theory presented here for the following reason. At the start of the campaign voter knowledge is low. Thus, our theory would predict that candidates should start by focusing on positive ads.
However, as voters gain knowledge about candidates, the candidates should shift to more negative messages. Although it seems that theory presented here might be able to explain an important aspect of the dynamics of negativity, it is reasonable to believe that a dynamic model would do a better job in such a task. Furthermore, such dynamic model might be able to capture some competitive effects that do not show up in the static model.
Demographic Control Variables
Here we describe the demographic variables used in the empirical work and also the factors that were created from them. The demographic measures are percentage in the district that (1) is white and not Hispanic, (2) holds a bachelors degree, (3) is unemployed, (4) is considered a family in poverty, (4) speaks a foreign language, (5) was born in a foreign country, (6) earns in the top income bracket, (7) owns a home, (8) lives in an urban area, (9) migrated within the U.S. in the last year, (10) migrated from outside the U.S. in the last year. In addition, our data also include the (12) average household income and (13) violent crime rate.
The demographic variables exhibited a high degree of correlation (e.g., educated districts tended to have higher incomes, districts with large foreign born populations also tended to speak foreign languages, districts with high unemployment tended to have larger poverty rates). This led to difficulties in interpreting their effect. Accordingly, we used factor analysis to reduce the dimensionality and to identify meaningful variation. We found a solution with 3 factors to be the best. Table   5 presents the factor loadings based on a promax rotation. All variables have been standardized and where the variables are missing, the analysis identified these relationships to be insignificant from zero. We have highlighted the three most influential variables for each factor. Clearly, the separation between these three variables and the other variables is fairly large. Furthermore, these variables make the interpretation of the factors quite simple. Accordingly, we name the first factor Educated_Income, the second F oreign, and the third P oor_NonW hite.
Budget Estimation for Control Function Approach
In the non-structural estimation we correct for budget endogeneity via a control function approach.
For this purpose we regress, in the first stage of the estimation, the log of the budget on the exogenous variables from the second stage estimation and on several additional variables. These variables are outlined in the main text and depicted in Table 6 . We use a log transform on the budget in order to correct for its empirical skewness.
P rior_Exposure_Self , the three closeness variables, two demographic factors (Educated_Income and P oor_NonW hite), and P ast_Contributions. The sign of these coefficients are as can be expected. Furthermore, note that some of the variables that have a significant effect (P ast_Contributions, Likelys, Leanings, and T ossU ps) are our excluded variables (i.e., they do not appear in the final second stage regression).
In the tradition of the control function approach we use the residuals from this regression to proxy for the endogenous component of the Budget variable. Of course, the second stage regression includes also the variable Budget as well. Note: This is the subset of data used for the non--structural estimation (where ad spending is non--zero). The summary table for all two--candidate races is available in the web appendix Table 3 . 
